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Abstract 
 
Long time-horizon environmental risks with 
potential for global impacts have increased in visibility 
over the past several decades. Such issues as climate 
change, the nuclear fuel cycle, persistent synthetic 
chemicals, and stratospheric ozone depletion share some 
characteristics, including intergenerational impacts, 
strongly decoupled incidence of risks and benefits, 
substantial decision stakes and extreme uncertainty. What 
is not well understood are the similarities and differences 
among sources and implications of uncertainty among 
these global environmental threats, especially those 
associate with current and future human behavior. This 
describes the uncertainties associated with managing two 
global concerns: the nuclear (fission) fuel cycle and 
anthropogenic climate change. It finds that the two issue 
share some common uncertainties, some highly 
differentiated uncertainties and some interdependent 
uncertainty. It argues that these uncertainties preclude 
simple conclusions about the tradeoffs between risks from 
anthropogenic climate change and those from nuclear 
power. It concludes that a framework that treats 
uncertainty as an aspect of management, not as an 
analytical challenge, will both improve options for 
effective policy making and provide direction for useful 
(from a policy perspective) future research.  
1. Introduction 
This year we celebrate the remarkable advances in 
physics made by Albert Einstein1. However, one point that 
arguably links Einstein more with classical physicists than 
with the physics he inspired is represented by his famous 
claim that “God does not play dice with the universe.” His 
contemporary and intellectual sparring partner Neils Bohr 
observed that it is not just the case that we cannot predict 
such things as the direction of a nuclear decay; rather, such 
things are irreducibly uncertain. They cannot be known.  
Recently, Kennedy [2] presented an increasingly 
familiar argument: in making decisions about risks with 
                                                          
1 This paragraphs draws heavily on [1] 
potential global-scale consequences, we should engage in 
risk-benefit tradeoff assessment at an appropriate scale. 
Kennedy took particular issue with social decisions about 
risks and benefits of nuclear power that do not address 
potential tradeoffs with the climate change potential of 
power from fossil fuels. However, recent research [3, 4, 5] 
suggests that uncertainty is likely to overwhelm meaningful 
differentiations based strictly on risks and benefits. 
Further, both of these topics require informed actions at 
the individual, group, cultural and governmental levels and 
involve effects that span not only multiple generations, but 
possibly multiple civilizations. Consequently, relying on 
one peculiar deterministic tool—risk-risk tradeoff—is 
unlikely to result in a credible short-term solution. Further, 
making deterministic decisions in the face of extreme 
uncertainty could easily preclude future dominant options. 
This leads to the question: what if we treat uncertainty a 
central aspect of decisions, rather than as an analytical 
limitation?  
Among Kennedy’s claims is that “when society makes a 
decision…it is usually based on a comparison of risks and 
benefits.” This claim is problematic—while considered by 
some to be a desirable decision rule, it is not clear that 
society does or can apply such a rule, whether formally or 
informally. Further, to the extent that Kennedy’s claim 
holds, it can only hold when we can reasonably predict 
optimum choices between various risks. This is not the case 
for nuclear power and climate change. 
The extreme uncertainty associated with risks and 
benefits of nuclear power and global climate change 
preclude an optimizing calculation. Indeed, under certain 
assumptions about uncertainty, a risk-benefit tradeoff 
decision based on some set of calculated values would be 
less desirable than what we might expect from a random 
decision. This does not mean, however, that the historically 
ad hoc and disaggregated approach to nuclear energy and 
climate change policy should continue. In its place, an 
adaptive management approach that formally accounts for 
uncertainty will optimize the chances of not precluding the 
optimum decision. Such an approach seeks expected value 
decisions only when there is a high probability that they 
will occur, and otherwise a) avoids worst-case scenarios 
and b) maximizes alternatives. 
2. Uncertainty: Similarities, Differences, 
Overlap 
Nuclear power and anthropogenic climate change are 
among the most intractable of public decision arenas. Both 
are “transcientific” in the sense envisioned by Weinberg 
[6], where questions can be asked of science but not 
answered by science. We cannot directly test, nor even 
come close to testing the hypotheses we’re most interested 
in. For example, to test the hypothesis that a 1% annual 
increase in global CO2 will increase global temperatures 
by 1 C over a 50 year period would require running one set 
of earths at fixed CO2 and another set at a 1% annual 
increase. Similarly, questions about the frequency of future 
radiation releases along the nuclear fuel cycle, and about 
the potency of low doses of that radiation, cannot be 
directly assessed.  
Nuclear power and anthropogenic climate change have 
some similar sources of uncertainty, some common 
sources of uncertainty, some different sources of 
uncertainty, and some imbalanced sources of uncertainty. 
In both cases, decisions will be made long before the 
outcomes will be known with any degree of certainty, 
expected incidence of impacts increases with time, 
multiple and interacting disciplines contribute knowledge, 
and decision stakes are extremely high. Both require long-
term energy use and price forecasting.  
However, while both will have global impacts, the 
individual negative impacts of nuclear power will be more 
local than those of climate change. Also, while both areas 
require interdisciplinary inputs, both have evolved distinct 
practices of analysis and communication. Perhaps more 
important, the trans-generational incidence of costs and 
benefits is inverted: costs of climate change abatement will 
be immediate with benefits accruing to future generations. 
In contrast, the benefits of nuclear power are immediate, 
while potential costs are spread among current and future 
generations. The following section expands on each of 
these similarities and differences. 
As noted above, the nature of these two areas precludes 
direct examination. One consequence of this is the need 
for contributions from diverse disciplines, with different 
and sometimes conflicting analytical norms. It is clear 
from cases of high uncertainty but more localized context, 
disciplinary conflict can create or highlight uncertainty. 
For example when the Congress reauthorized the Clean 
Air Act, epidemiologists and toxicologists suggested very 
different conclusions about the potency of various particles 
[7]. Similarly, as the California Department of Health 
Services developed rules for exposure to electromagnetic 
fields (EMF’s) from high voltage power lines, historically 
vitriolic disputes among epidemiologists, toxicologists and 
physicists undermined efforts to generate useful and 
credible information [8]. 
Many decision rules—especially the types of decision 
rules that we are comfortable with—treat uncertainty as a 
component of analysis. In this context, uncertainty is 
usually seen as a shortcoming or limitation of analysis. 
Often, decisions appear to assume that a) uncertainty will 
get smaller as we develop more information and b) that we 
should expect the tightened uncertainty bars to converge on 
some central point in the uncertainty range. Alternatively, 
some upper or lower values is selected as a sort of “hedge” 
against uncertainty [9, 10]. Indeed, this is another form of 
behavioral uncertainty: we don’t understand well how 
decision makers, nor even experts, interpret uncertainty.  
Thinking of uncertainty, especially the extreme and 
long-term uncertainty associated with climate change and 
nuclear power, as part of the management process, may 
lead to more salutary decisions. Where uncertainty as a 
limitation leads to deterministic decisions, uncertainty as a 
decision component leads to adaptive management. Rather 
than seeking to minimize, adjust for or avoid uncertainty, 
we can make decisions that allow flexibility in the face of 
new information. 
In the case of nuclear waste disposal, the US is currently 
committed to making a decision based on deterministic 
technical modeling over a time frame (one million years) 
over which uncertainty in the technical models is utterly 
obscured by uncertainty about human conditions. Analyses 
that attach some minimal flexibility to our current and 
future states of knowledge suggest considerably different 
dominant solutions than those we are currently 
pursuing[11]. We should expect similar results to follow 
application of adaptive management methods to other 
highly uncertain risks.  
Clearly, disciplinary conflict has long been documented 
in both the nuclear power and anthropogenic climate 
change debates. However, the academic and policy 
community have pay insufficient attention to remedies for 
this sort of conflict. This failure has allowed conflicts of 
varying degrees of credibility to fester—for example, there 
is reasonable debate about the chronic impacts of small 
doses of ionizing radiation, while there may be 
unreasonable debate about the expected failure rate of 
containers destined for Yucca Mountain. Treating expert 
conflict as a type of uncertainty, and developing 
communicative tools for managing this uncertainty, is a 
critical step.  
Another uncertainty that the two issues have in common 
is that impacts will be incident on far future generations. In 
traditional risk-benefit analysis, with discounting over 
multiple generations, effects beyond 50 or so years—and 
certainly by 100 years—will have negligible value in 
current dollars. The ethics of discounting over such time 
periods has been the subject of extensive debate [12]. Less 
well explored, however, is our ability to predict the nature 
of human behavior and interactions in 200 years, much less 
the 10,000 or 1,000,000 years we associate with the nuclear 
waste debate.  
 
3. Predicting Human Behavior 
Predictions made in the 1970’s about “by the end of the 
century” energy predictions probably tell us more about the 
1970’s than they do about today [13]. However, we are still 
operating within the same cultural milieu as we were 
then—with some of the same energy analysts or their 
students still at work. This should give us pause as we 
think about our predictions for energy demand in, say, 
2050. Hubris would have us believe that we have learned 
from past mistakes and now can predict well [14]. 
Humility, however, should lead us to expect that our 
estimates will be wrong, even if this does not give us a 
sense of how they will be wrong nor how wrong they will 
be. Our response should be to think about energy futures in 
flexible terms that will preclude large mistakes and 
maximize better choices.  
Current studies in human behavior suggest how 
uncertain we are even about decision making and 
preferences of ourselves and our contemporaries. Gilbert 
[15] observes that we chronically overestimate how bad 
potential negative scenarios will be, and how good positive 
scenarios will be. Traditional deterministic assumptions of 
economists do not appear to hold for individuals under a 
wide range of conditions. Economists continue to believe 
that this represents an analytical shortcoming, while post-
modernists find the fault in economic assumptions.  
Uncertainty about human behavior goes well beyond 
the individual. Asimov [16] once envisioned 
psychohistory—wherein Harry Seldon used computers and 
data to predict human society into a distant future. It is 
now clear that sociological prediction is closer to Bohr’s 
world than it is to Einstein’s: we cannot reasonably predict 
individuals in 2007, society in 2050, civilization in 2200.  
Our best approach for making effective decisions—
assuming that it matters to us that far future generations 
have a strong set of options—is to leave open the best 
choices not just for a future society like ours but for future 
civilizations unlike ours. Risk – benefit tradeoffs may not 
be part of the traditions in that future, even if we design for 
them now. Adaptive management, broadly conceived, will 
almost certainly lead to more robust choices on not just 
nuclear power and climate change but emerging diseases, 
water resources planning, and other highly important, 
highly uncertain issues. 
 
4. Acknowledgements 
The author thanks Rob Goble for extensive comments 
and the National Science Foundation Human and Social 
Dimensions directorate for support.  
5. References 
[1] Peat, F. David (2006). From Certainty to Uncertainty: The 
Story of Science and Ideas in the Twentieth Century. Joseph 
Henry Press, NY NY. 
[2] Kennedy, D. (2005). “Editorial: Risks and risks.” Science 
309: 2137.  
[3] Hassenzahl, D. M. (2006). “Implications of Excessive 
Precision for Risk Comparisons: Lessons from the Past Four 
Decades.” Risk Analysis 26(1): 265 – 276 
[4] Hassenzahl, D. M. (2005). “The effect of uncertainty on 
‘risk rationalizing’ decisions.” Journal of Risk Research 8(2), 119 
– 138. 
[5] Heinzerling, L. (2002) Five-Hundred Life-Saving 
Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate over Regulatory 
Reform. Risk: Health, Safety and Environment 13(1/2): 151-175. 
[6] Weinberg, A. (1972). "Science and Trans-Science." 
Minerva, 10, 209-221 
[7] Ross, H. (2000). The Search for an Intelligible Principle: 
Setting Air Quality Standards Under the Clean Air Act. 
Resources for the Future Washington DC. 
[8] Hassenzahl, D. M., Kammen, D. M., Goble, R. L., Hattis, D. 
B. (1998). “Can risk assessments conclude that there is no risk?” 
Paper and presentation for the Society for Risk Analysis Annual 
Meeting (6-9 December, 1998, Phoenix, Arizona).  
[9] Hammitt, J. (1990) Probability is all we have. New York, 
Garland Publishing.  
[10] Finkel, A. M. (1989) Is Risk Assessment really too 
conservative?  revising the revisionists. Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 14: 427-467. 
[11] Keeney, Ralph A. and von Winterfeldt, Detlof (1994). 
“Managing nuclear waste from power plants.” Risk Analysis 
14(1) 107 – 130.  
[12] Dasgupta, P. and Maler, K-G. (1994). Poverty, Institutions, 
and the Environmental-Resource Base. World Bank environment 
paper no. 9. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
[13] Nordhaus, W. D. (1994). Expert opinion on Climate Change. 
American Scientist 82: 45 – 51. 
[14] Perrow, Charles (1999). Normal Accidents: Living with 
High-Risk Technologies. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
NJ. 
[15] Gilbert, Daniel (2006). Stumbling on Happiness. Knopf, NY 
NY.  
[16] Asimov, Isaac (1951). Foundation. Gnome Press 
